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Abstract
This paper analyzes the e®ect of information overload on preference or aversion for variety.
According to the model, a rational decision maker who su®ers from information overload,
faces a two-stage decision process, and is choosing from a set of unknown goods will ¯nd
it optimal at some point to become variety averse. To test this hypothesis, an experiment
is conducted, and its results, that subjects su®ering from information overload use variety
aversion as a strategy to deal with their cognitive limitations, are consistent with the model.
Moreover, results suggest that subjects are, on the average, choosing the optimal number of
goods. As the price of the goods increases, subjects become more variety averse. In addition,
as they become more experienced, they prefer larger sets of goods.
Keywords: Variety aversion, information overload, bounded rationality, decision making,
laboratory experiment.
JEL Classi¯cation: C91, D81, D83.
Resumen
En el documento se analiza el efecto que una sobrecarga de informaci¶ on genera sobre la prefe-
rencia o aversi¶ on por variedad. De acuerdo al modelo, ser¶ a ¶ optimo para un agente racional,
que tiene limitaciones para procesar informaci¶ on, que enfrenta un proceso de decisi¶ on en
dos etapas y que est¶ a eligiendo de un conjunto de bienes desconocido, volverse adverso a la
variedad. Para probar la hip¶ otesis anterior, se realiza un experimento cuyos resultados son
consistentes con el modelo: los sujetos utilizan aversi¶ on a la variedad como una estrategia
para lidiar con su limitaci¶ on para procesar informaci¶ on. Adem¶ as, los resultados sugieren que
los sujetos eligen, en promedio, el n¶ umero ¶ optimo de bienes a analizar y que al aumentar
el precio de los bienes pre¯eren conjuntos m¶ as peque~ nos. Por otra parte, al aumentar su
experiencia pre¯eren conjuntos m¶ as grandes.
Palabras Clave: Aversi¶ on a la variedad, sobrecarga de informaci¶ on, racionalidad limitada,
toma de decisiones, experimento de laboratorio.
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Experimental evidence suggests that the number of options consumers face may have
a negative impact on satisfaction and buying behavior (Iyengar and Lepper, 2000; Shah
and Wolford, 2007; Boatwright and Nunes, 2001; Reutskaya and Hogarth, 2009). Research
further suggests that decision makers (DMs) might like to restrict their options; for example,
there is evidence that students commit to certain deadlines (Ariely and Wertenbroch, 2002);
that consumers voluntarily, and strategically, ration the purchase quantities of goods that
may cause problems of self-control (Wertenbroch, 1988); and that subjects in an abstract
setting sometimes prefer a subset of the larger set when choosing from lotteries (Salgado,
2006). Among the explanations for this evidence are the increased complexity of the cognitive
process, self-control problems, cognitive overload, and regret (Gourville and Soman, 2005;
Wertenbroch, 2002; Salgado, 2006; Sarver 2008).
In line with this evidence that DMs might like to restrict their options, in this paper I
study preference for variety and, in particular, the e⁄ect of a speci￿c cognitive limitation on
preferences over sets. Following the neuroscience and psychology literatures, which suggest
that subjects cannot focus on a speci￿c set of information and that they are distracted
by task-irrelevant information, I study the behavior of a DM who su⁄ers from information
overload. The DM is unable to focus on a speci￿c subset of information and is even worse
o⁄ when she has too much information.
On the one hand, neuroscientists have long studied the importance of staying focused
in order to perform coherent cognitive functions, including the ability to remain focused on
a task in the presence of distractors (Lavie, 2005). On the other, psychologists were the
￿rst to document that too much information can distract consumers, can create a cognitive
limitation on processing information, and can cause consumers to make worse decisions.
They called this phenomenon "information overload" (Jacoby, Speller, and Berning, 1974;
Scammon, 1977; Muller 1984; Jacoby ,1984; Keller and Staelin, 1987).
Following the experimental literature on the study of strategic behavior in the presence of
cognitive limitations (Camerer, Johnson, Rymon, Senkarl, 1993; Gabaix, Laibson, Moloche,
Weinberg, 2006; Costa-Gomes and Crawford, 2006), I test ￿rst whether subjects su⁄er from
information overload and then test whether subjects take into consideration their limited
capacity to process information and maximize their utility by internalizing their cognitive
limitation (for example, Simon, 1955).
The hypothesis tested in the experiment is based on a model where a rational DM su⁄ers
from information overload, faces a two-stage decision process, and is choosing from a set of
goods of unknown quality. In the ￿rst stage DM has to choose how many goods she would
1like to receive information about. In the second stage, with the information she recalls, she
chooses a good from those in her choice set.
At the beginning of the decision process DM only knows that quality is distributed
uniformly, but with no information goods are ex ante identical. For each of the goods that
belong to the set DM is considering, a bit of information will be generated that reveals the
quality of the good. Once DM receives the information on each good in the set, she has to
process it and then choose the highest-quality good. DM￿ s cognitive limitation on processing
information is modeled by endowing DM with a technology to process information. This is
modeled as a function that, for every variety (size of set, n), determines the probability
distribution over the number of bits of information that DM will be able to process. This
function is known to DM, who incorporates it when choosing the size of the choice set.
As variety (the number of options DM considers) increases, so does the ￿ ow of information
DM is receiving. If the rational DM su⁄ers from information overload, her expected utility
might start to decrease if variety is increased beyond a certain point. This suggests that
for some number of options the DM should become variety averse. Theorem 1 shows that
decreasing the expected total amount of information processed is su¢ cient to generate a
preference for smaller sets.
To test experimentally the implications of this model, in the ￿rst treatment I study
whether subjects su⁄er from information overload or not. In the treatments that follow I
study the e⁄ects of the presence of this phenomenon on preference or aversion for variety.
In all treatments subjects will have to choose a good from a set of goods￿ de￿ned as
bundles of ￿ve attributes, where the value of each attribute is given to the subject but not
the value of the good (this abstract setting is similar to Gabaix, Laibson, Moloche, Weinberg,
2006). Each good is a column with ￿ve entries, and the best alternative is simply the column
whose attributes have the highest sum. At the beginning of the experiment subjects know
that the value of each attribute is distributed uniformly over f20;:::;100g.
To generate the limited capacity to process information, I use two common practices:
￿rst, in order to ￿nd out the quality of the good, subjects will have to perform the cognitive
task of adding the value of the attributes; and second, subjects will function under a time
constraint. There is a time limit for execution of cognitive operations; having less time
than required for the task simulates a cognitive limitation (Neisser, 1963). To generate this
limitation, subjects are given 25 seconds to select an object from the set; if time runs out
before the subject makes a choice, her payo⁄for that round is zero. In each treatment, each
subject plays for ten rounds.
To be able to study the subjects￿preference or aversion for variety, in some treatments
participants face a two-stage decision process: in the ￿rst stage, they can choose variety,
2that is, how many options they want to consider. In the second stage, they see the number
of columns they chose in the ￿rst round and can pick one. For each good that belongs to the
degree of variety they have chosen, the value of its ￿ve attributes appears on the screen. It
is important to mention that all the information is displayed at the same time and remains
visible while the decision stage lasts. The payo⁄ of each round is the value of the chosen
alternative multiplied by a conversion rate, known at the beginning.
In the experiment, I also analyze the e⁄ects of the DM￿ s previous experience and of the
decision process￿ s complexity . To increase the complexity of the task, in some treatments
I introduce a price (p), which imposes an additional requirement for subjects to receive a
positive payo⁄: the value of a column chosen must exceed p. Intuition suggests that the
more complex the DM￿ s information-processing task the more likely DM will be to prefer
smaller sets. Note that increasing the size of the choice set does not have an (explicit) cost;
the price has to be paid only when a column is chosen in the second-stage decision.
The experimental results con￿rm the two main hypotheses of the paper: subjects su⁄er
from information overload, and they rationally use variety aversion as a strategy to deal
with this problem. Results from Treatment 1 show that as the amount of information
increases, the performance of the average subject decreases. Moreover, it can be inferred
that the number of columns that maximized the average payo⁄lay between 12 and 16, which
is smaller than the maximum number of columns available (20). Results from Treatment
2, where subjects could themselves choose the extent of variety, con￿rm that subjects use
variety aversion to deal with their cognitive limitation. Results also suggest that the average
choice of variety belongs to the optimal range (12 to 16); this reveals that subjects are dealing
strategically with their limitation on processing information and are optimizing correctly.
As the price subjects have to pay for consuming a good increases, their aversion for
variety also increases. After playing ten rounds with no price, subjects face a price in the
eleventh round, and as a result the average size of the set chosen is reduced from 12.25 to
7.2 columns. On the other hand, also as expected, experienced subjects prefer larger sets,
and they perform better. This suggests that experience helps them improve their ability to
handle more information and hence increase their payo⁄.
1.1 Related Literature
In contrast to previous literature on bounded rationality where DM can control which
information to see and which information not to see while the choice set remains ￿xed
(Gabaix, Laibson, 2003; Wilson, 2006; Gabaix, Laibson, Moloche, and Weinberg, 2006),
in this paper all the information about the goods is displayed during the entire decision-
3making stage. This paper focuses on studying whether DM uses the strategy of decreasing
her consideration set to control the information ￿ ow.
As does other experimental literature (Camerer, Johnson, Rymon, Senkarl, 1993; Gabaix,
Laibson, Moloche, Weinberg, 2006; Costa-Gomes and Crawford, 2006), I analyze the strat-
egy used by subjects in the presence of some cognitive limitations. However, in contrast
to this literature, I do not study the algorithm used by subjects to process information;
rather, I study whether subjects decrease the number of objects in their consideration set to
complement whatever algorithm they are using to process information.
Most of the evidence on the e⁄ects of variety on satisfaction and behavior comes from
studies where di⁄erent choice conditions are given to subjects (Iyengar and Lepper, 2000;
Shah and Wolford, 2007; Boatwright and Nunes, 2001). Once subjects go through the
decision process, their behavior is analyzed. Salgado (2006) presents a di⁄erent methodology,
where subjects can choose between two di⁄erent sizes of choice sets (in the ￿rst treatment, one
choice set had ￿ve alternatives and the other twenty ￿ve; and in the second, one had ￿ve and
the other ￿fty). However, as in previous literature, Salgado infers from subjects￿revealed
preferences over two possible choice sets, in di⁄erent settings, whether or not they su⁄er
from cognitive overload. The main methodological di⁄erence that distinguishes my paper
from this literature is that I ￿rst test whether subjects su⁄er from information overload
and then analyze their preference or aversion for variety (giving the subjects a large set
of variety options to choose from). This allows me to establish a link between a speci￿c
phenomenon￿ information overload￿ and preference or aversion for variety.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 the formal model is presented. In section
3 the experimental design is explained and in section 4 results are presented. In the last
section I conclude.
2 Model
The DM will choose a good from a set of unknown goods. She knows that the quality of
the goods is uniformly distributed in the interval [0;1] but ex ante they are identical. The
utility of consuming a good of quality q is u(q) = q, and the reservation utility is zero.
DM su⁄ers from information overload. She has a limited capacity to process information
and too much information can make her worse o⁄. For each good that belongs to the choice
set, a bit of information that reveals the quality of the good will be generated and received
by DM. However, it might happen that DM will not be able to process all the information.
The capacity to process n bits of information M(n) = b(n;￿(n)) is modeled as a binomial
distribution with parameters (n;￿(n)), where n is the support and ￿(n) is the probability
4of a success. In order to incorporate the fact that DM su⁄ers from information overload, it
is assumed that ￿(n) is strictly decreasing.
For example, if M(n) = b(n;(1=n)) and the choice set has two goods, two bits of infor-
mation will be generated; however, probability is :25 that no information will be processed,
:5 that DM will process information about the quality of only one good, and :25 that she
will process information about the quality of both goods.
When DM processes information about some number of goods, she will always choose the
good with the highest quality. The ex ante expected utility of processing ‘ bits of information
is the expected value of the maximum of ‘ draws from a uniform distribution in the interval
[0;1]. If no information is processed, DM does not decide which good to consume and gets
a utility of zero. This would imply that too much information can harm DMs so much that
they would not pick anything from the set. This modeling choice tries to capture the fact
that in some situations subjects do not make a choice even when they would have been better
o⁄ choosing randomly than not choosing at all.1
At the beginning of the decision process DM takes into account her limitation on process-
ing information and decides how many goods she would like to have in her choice set. Note
that if she considers more goods, the expected quality, for any number of bits of processed
information, increases. However, the probability of states where little or no information is
processed also increases. DM chooses n in order to maximize:
max
n UM(n) = E‘ [maxfq0;:::;q‘g] (2.1)
As long as there is some probability of losing information by increasing the number of
objects considered in making a choice, it is optimal to analyze a ￿nite number of goods.
The bene￿t of adding one more good decreases as the size of the set increases. The cost of
increasing the size of the set is that the probability of receiving no information increases. As
n gets larger, the bene￿ts decrease faster than the costs, and at some point the costs become
larger than the bene￿ts.
Theorem 1 When the amount of information that DM processes is binomial with parame-
ters (n;￿(n)) with ￿(n) strictly decreasing; DM chooses the maximum of those n signals, and
each signal is uniformly distributed in [0;1];, there exists an n￿ < 1 such that n￿ maximizes
DM￿ s payo⁄.
Proof. Is in Appendix 6.1
1The observed behavior in the experiment is consistent with this assumption. Some subjects in some
rounds did not make a choice and, as a result, got a payo⁄ of zero.
53 Experimental Design
A good or an object is a column with ￿ve numbers, with each number generated from
a uniform distribution over the integer numbers {20,...,100}. In order to know the value
of a good, subjects have to add the values of the ￿ve rows.2 A game is a matrix with 20
columns and ￿ve rows. A choice set is a subset of a game. Each treatment consisted of ten
consecutive rounds, and in each round subjects played a di⁄erent game (an example of the
computer interface can be seen in Appendix 6.3).
A round could have either one stage or two stages, depending on the treatment. All
subjects, no matter in which treatment they participated, at some stage had to choose a
column from a choice set; at this stage they were time constrained, having only 25 seconds
to choose a column. The screen showed a clock where they could see how much time was
left.
Payo⁄s in the experiment were denominated in francs. For each treatment there was a
conversion rate that subjects were aware of as they begin the treatment. The payo⁄for each
round was the value of their choice multiplied by the conversion rate. All participants were
paid what they earned during the experiment plus a show-up fee of $10.
The experimental design included four di⁄erent treatments. The ￿rst treatment, no
choice, is used to study whether subjects su⁄er from information overload. The other three
treatments (choice, choice-price [experienced], and choice-price [inexperienced]) are used to
analyze the e⁄ects of information overload on variety aversion and how it relates to the DM￿ s
experience with the task and the task￿ s complexity (Table 3.1 summarizes the characteristics
of each treatment). In all treatments subjects completed a survey that recorded some of their
personal characteristics.
Table 3.1: Experimental Design
name Choice set Experience Price
















The experiment took place through computer terminals at the Princeton Laboratory
for Experimental Social Science. Participants were students from Princeton University. In
each of the treatments 40 students participated. Appendix 6.3 provides an example of
2This type of task is also used in Gabaix, et al. (2006).
6the computer interface used. The computer program was designed using Multistage game
software.
3.1 Information overload
3.1.1 Treatment 1: no choice.
In this treatment, the choice set was assigned to the subjects on each round. As the
number of rounds increased, so did the size of the choice set, with increments of two columns
per round. On the ￿rst round subjects chose a column from a set of 2 columns, and by the
last round they chose from a set of 20 columns.3 In each round subjects had 25 seconds to
choose a column. If time ran out before they made a choice, the payo⁄ for that round was
zero.
Each subject played each game only once, but the number of columns seen during each
game was di⁄erent depending on which round they were playing. This was done to help
the comparison of how the average payo⁄changed when the number of alternatives changed
(Appendix 6.4 shows the algorithm followed to assign a game to each subject). The payo⁄
in each round was the value of a column multiplied by the conversion rate (which, for this
treatment, was .002).
Once the treatment was ￿nished, subjects completed a survey where they were asked some
questions about the previous treatment and were queried about some of their demographic
characteristics (a sample of the survey appears in Appendix 6.6). After completing the
survey, subjects were asked to participate in another treatment that served as a pilot for the
subsequent treatments.
3.2 Variety aversion
In this set of treatments, I study the preference or aversion for variety of subjects who
participated in the experiment. To be able to do this, participants faced a two-stage decision
process. In each round participants had to make two choices: ￿rst, they had to decide the
number of columns they wanted to choose from in the following stage; and then, from that
number of columns, they had to select one. In each treatment they played ten rounds, and
in each round all players played the same game. No subject played the same game twice.
3I did not run a treatment where the size of the choice set decreased from 20 to 2, but considered only the
case where the number of columns increased with the number of rounds. If subjects su⁄er from information
overload when complexity of the task is increasing and they can gain experience in each round (increasing
order), it can be argued that information overload should be observed when the scenario is more complicated
(decreasing order).
73.2.1 Treatment 2: choice.
This treatment is analogous to Treatment 1, the only di⁄erence being that the choice set
is not given to the subjects. In this treatment, in the ￿rst stage of each round subjects had
to choose the size of their choice set, and in the second stage they had to choose a column
from that choice set. In the second stage subjects were time constrained, having only 25
seconds to choose a column. If time ran out, their payo⁄ for that round was zero. The set
of games that was played was the same as in Treatment 1, and the same conversion rate was
used (.002). Subjects who participated in Treatment 2 were inexperienced; they had played
in no other treatment before, and they had had no previous contact with the experimental
setting.
3.2.2 Treatment 3: choice-price[experience].
To increase the complexity of the task subjects are performing, I introduce a price. Now,
if subjects are not su¢ ciently careful, even if they choose the best column available, they
might be choosing something that is worth less than the price and therefore have a negative
payo⁄. The price scheme is such that subjects had to pay a price only when they chose a
column; there was no (explicit) cost of increasing the size of the choice set before making
this choice.
The payo⁄ for each round was computed as the value of the column chosen minus the
price they had to pay (340 francs). They had no budget constraint so they could always
buy; however, if their total payo⁄ at the end of the tenth round was negative, they earned
zero dollars for that treatment. Even if subjects￿total payo⁄ was negative, participants
had incentives to continue playing: given that they could still buy, they could ￿nish the
treatment with a positive payo⁄ as long as they exerted e⁄ort and were careful.
If subjects did not make a choice during the 25 seconds, their payo⁄ for that round was
zero. The conversion rate for this part was (.0085).4 The participants in Treatment 3 had
played before in Treatment 2, meaning that subjects had experience with the choice setting.
3.2.3 Treatment 4: choice-price[inexperience].
This treatment is exactly the same as Treatment 3, the only di⁄erence being that subjects
who participated in it had no previous experience; they had not played previously in any
other treatment.




In this section I analyze whether the interface used in the experiment generated infor-
mation overload in the subjects. It is important to distinguish between the two components
of information overload: the ￿rst one is that subjects have a limited capacity to process
information, and the second one is that they cannot ignore the information they are not able
to process; because they are distracted by it, their performance deteriorates.
A simple way to analyze whether subjects have a limited capacity to process information
is by studying the percentage of subjects who chose the alternative with the maximum value,
as the number of columns increased. Figure 4.1 shows the percentage of subjects who chose
the best option available (Table 6.1 in the Appendix shows the exact values). As the number
of options increased, the number of subjects who chose correctly declined (Table 6.2 in the
Appendix shows the probit with ￿xed e⁄ects; the probability of choosing the best alternative
decreases as the number of columns increases). This suggests that, as the number of columns
increased, subjects found it harder to process all the information available and therefore to
￿nd the column with the maximum value. However, this fact alone does not con￿rm that
subjects su⁄ered from information overload.
Figure 4.1: Percentage of correct responses and Mean Payo⁄ per round.
Another way of analyzing the limitation on the processing of information is by comparing
the average payo⁄ between rounds. The treatment was designed so that the comparison of
the average payo⁄ in each round could say something about the performance of subjects
(Appendix 6.4 shows the algorithm followed to assign to each subject a game). As can be
seen in Figure 4.1 (Table 6.3 in the Appendix shows also the standard errors), the mean
payo⁄when the number of columns was 20 is 360.325, which is smaller than the mean payo⁄
9when there were 16 columns (mean 370.75). As the number of columns increases beyond 16,
the mean payo⁄ decreases. Under the assumption that subjects have the same ability, the
mean payo⁄ per round should not decrease, and the fact that it does suggests that there is
information overload. If ability di⁄ered among subjects, this would only suggest that there
is a limitation on the capacity to process information.
Figure 4.2: Relationship between payo⁄ and the number of columns
To control for the characteristics of the subjects, including ability, and be able to test
if subjects su⁄ered from information overload, I ran a quadratic regression with individual
￿xed e⁄ects of the payo⁄ on the number of columns. Table 4.1 shows the predicted number
of columns and the 95% con￿dence interval. Figure 4.2 shows the ￿tted values for the
regression.5 It can be seen that there is a maximum. The predicted number of columns
that maximize the payo⁄ is 13.75 columns, and the biggest possible size of the choice set
(20) does not belong to the 95% con￿dence interval of the argmax. The results suggest that
having more than 16 columns or less than 12 makes DMs worse o⁄, and this is consistent
with the presence of information overload.
5The values are in Table 6.4 in the Appendix.

















***,**,*, indicate signi￿cance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent, respectively.
s.e in parenthesis.
Treatment 1: The size of the choice set increased by two columns each round.
The cardinality of the smallest set was 2 (round 1) and of the biggest was 20 (round 10).
Another method I use to study if subjects su⁄ered from information overload was to
compute the expected payo⁄ of an individual for participating in the treatment, assuming
she would behave according to the behavior distribution of subjects who participated in
Treatment 1. I classi￿ed each observation according to the following criteria: I assigned the
value kc;i 2 f1;:::;20g; to subject i0s choice when there were c columns available, if there
were k columns with a value smaller or equal to the value of i0s choice. This generates
fki;cg
40
i=1 and a distribution kc overf1;:::;20g for each number of columns c. Note that this
is equivalent to saying that an agent kc;i; when the size of choice set is c; chooses a ￿xed
number of columns k; and from those columns chooses the maximum.6
To compute the expected payo⁄s for each kc￿level; Ec [pk]; I use the following rule for
ki;c = c ￿ j:7
(
Ec [pc￿j] = E [yc￿j;c￿j] if j is even
Ec [pc￿j] = E [yc￿j;c￿j+1] if j is odd
For every number of columns c there is a vector of expected payo⁄s Ec [p] 2 R20; with
coordinates Ec [pk] = 0 for k > c: It is important to note that, to be able to conclude
that subjects su⁄er from information overload, I construct Ec [p] so that the coordinates
(Ec [p1];:::;Ec [pc￿2]) are the same as (Ec￿2 [p1];:::;Ec￿2 [pc￿2]): By doing this I make sure
that in case the pool of subjects that participated in Treatment 1 did not su⁄er from in-
6If a subject is not distracted by the number of columns available (that is, if she did not su⁄er from
information overload), kc;i should not be decreasing in c:
7yn;c;:::;y1;c denote the ordered statistics when the value of a column is drawn c times. The maximum is
when n = c and the minimum when n = 1: The value of a column is distributed according to the distribution
of the sum of ￿ve numbers, each generated from a uniform distribution over the integers f20;:::;100g:
11formation overload the expected payo⁄ of participating in the treatment would have been
increasing in the number of columns.
I compute the expected payo⁄ of participating in the experiment: kc ￿ Ec [p] for every
possible number of columns available. As can be seen in Table 4.2, if it is assumed that
an individual who participates in this experiment will behave according to the behavior
distribution kc generated by the pool of subjects in our sample, it can be concluded that
an average participant will maximize her payo⁄ if she chooses from a set with 16 columns
rather than from a set with 20 columns.
Table 4.2: Expected payo⁄ of participating in the experiment.
Columns 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
Expected Payo⁄ 325:3 350:9 364:8 369:5 377:7 383: 377:7 390:5 383:9 385:8
Expected payo⁄ taking as given the distribution over the number of columns analyzed by subjects in Treatment 1.
In order to apply the previous methodology to the games that were actually played.
I computed the expected payo⁄of using the k￿strategy for each realization of the games and
every round, assuming the subject picked k columns randomly from the c columns available
and from those k chose the maximum. Because I know exactly which game each subject
saw in each round, I compared the payo⁄ of the subject in each round with the expected
payo⁄ of an agent-k for that particular game and assigned her the value k that described
her behavior. If the value of her payo⁄ was between k = 2 and k = 4; the value k = 3 was
assigned to that subject in that round. I called this variable "as if" and for every size of
the set f2;4;6;:::;20g I have a distribution over "as if," behavior.
With each of these distributions I computed the expected payo⁄ of participating in the
experiment, assuming that an average subject would behave as the sample did. Taking the
distribution of "as if" behavior as given for each number of columns, the expected payo⁄has
a maximum when there are 12 columns (Table 4.3).
12Table 4.3: Expected payo⁄, considering "as if" behavior.
Columns 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
Expected Payo⁄ 331:2 349:6 363:8 370:8 372:1 384:4 371:3 375:2 374:5 373:9
Expected payo⁄ taking as given the "as if" behavior distribution generated by subjects in Treatment 1.
The previous ￿ndings (Table 4.2 and Table 4.3) suggest that subjects not only are not
able to process all the information available but also are "distracted" by it. As the number
of columns available increases, their performance starts to deteriorate, which is consistent
with information overload.
At the end of the experiment, when subjects were asked whether they were distracted
by the presence of too many columns, 85% answered positively. They were also asked how
many columns they would like to choose from, and the average number of columns selected
was 6.0975, the median and mode were 5 columns. Twenty subjects answered that they
would prefer to choose from a set with 20 columns.
From Treatment 1 we may conclude that subjects su⁄ered from information overload.
The more columns there were, subjects were, on average, able to analyze fewer columns.
Subjects were not able to focus on a speci￿c number of columns; they were "distracted"
and therefore made worse choices when more options were available. Moreover, the results
suggest that the optimum number of columns lies between 12 and 16.
4.2 Variety Aversion: Choosing the Size of the Choice Set
The only di⁄erence between Treatment 2 (choice) and Treatment 1 (no choice) is that in
Treatment 2 each round has two stages. In the ￿rst stage, at the beginning of each round
subjects could choose how many columns they wanted to choose from in the next stage of
that round. The conversion rate, number of rounds, and time constraint were the same in
all cases.
At the beginning of each round subjects could choose an even number (from 2 to 20)
of columns to see in the next screen. Once they clicked ￿submit,￿the chosen number of
columns appeared on the screen and they could choose a column from that set. An example
of the computer interface can be seen in Appendix 6.3.
13Table 4.4 shows the mean size of the set chosen per round in Treatment 2. The values
of the means belong to the interval [10.65,12.4]; the maximum was 12.4 in round 5. The
average number of columns chosen among all rounds was 11.425, and the median was 10. In
the ten rounds, 40% of subjects chose 20 columns at least once. Of these, 17.5 % chose 20
always and 20% continued choosing 20 after they chose it for the ￿rst time (the frequency
table is in the Appendix in Table 6.5).
Table 4.4: Mean number of columns chosen by round.

























Note: data from Treatment 2. Subjects choice of the size of their choice set; s.e in parenthesis.
4.2.1 Do subjects behave di⁄erently?
Standard economic theory would predict that subjects would not behave di⁄erently
whether the choice condition was given to them or they chose it themselves. Once the
subject faces a choice set, she should maximize her consumption value. To see if subjects
behaved di⁄erently in this experiment, I compared the choice (T2) and no choice (T1) treat-
ments with regard to the "as if" behavior, the percentage of participants choosing the best
alternative, and the average time spent per column.8
Table 4.5 suggests that the best behavior in both cases is observed when there are 12
columns. Note that in the no-choice treatment there are 40 observations for each number of
columns. However, for the choice treatment the number of observations is not the same for
each number of columns, because people are choosing how many columns they want to see.
The last column of the table suggests there is some self-selection e⁄ect: subjects who chose
20 columns (choice) did better than the mean payo⁄ when all subjects had to pick from 20
columns. However, even if there is some self-selection, subjects who chose more than 12 are
not, on average, doing any better than those who chose 12 in (T2).9
8"As if" behavior is a variable constructed in the following way: I compared the payo⁄ of the subject in
each round with the expected payo⁄ of an agent-k for the particular game she was playing and assigned her
the value k that described her behavior. An agent-k assumes the subject picked k columns randomly from
the c columns available and from those k chose the maximum.
9We can see that 20 columns were chosen 96 times; however, only 7 subjects always chose 20 columns.
14Table 4.5: Comparison of the expected payo⁄ taking as given the "as if" behavior.
Columns 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
























Expected payo⁄ taking as given the distribution over the "as if" behavior. Note: the number of observations is always 40 for Treatment 1.
Another important fact is that the percentage of subjects who chose the best alternative
in both treatments, for the same number of columns, is not di⁄erent (Figure 4.3, exact values
are in Table 6.1 in the Appendix). This suggests that subjects process the same information
whether they choose the number of columns or are given to them.
Figure 4.3: Percentage of correct choices and Mean time spent per column
One di⁄erence observed in the subjects￿behavior is that those who chose the size of the
set spent more time per column than those who did not.10 The di⁄erence in mean time per
column is signi￿cant starting from the fourth round; this can be seen in Figure 4.3 (exact
10Time is measured in milliseconds; 1 second is 1,000 milliseconds.
15values are in Table 6.6 in the Appendix). This suggests that having control over the number
of options makes people pay more attention.
4.2.2 The e⁄ects of increasing the complexity of the task and experience
To increase the complexity of the task, I ran some treatments (choice-price[exp] (T3) and
choice-price[inexp] (T4)) where subjects had to pay a price each time they chose a column
from their choice set. There was no cost to increasing the size of the choice set, and if
subjects let the time run out without choosing a column, they would pay zero and earn zero
francs. The price they had to pay was 340 francs, which is greater than the expected value
of a column (300 francs). Whenever subjects chose a column, the payo⁄ for that round was
the value of the column chosen minus the price (340 Francs) multiplied by the conversion
rate (.0085).
The main di⁄erence between the choice-price[exp] and choice-price[inexp] treatments is
that in choice-price[exp], subjects were experienced. The pool of subjects that participated
in Treatment 3, choice-price[exp], is the same pool of subjects that participated in Treatment
2 (choice), where the price was zero.
Figure 4.4: Mean Size of the Choice Set
The e⁄ect of adding a price can be analyzed by comparing Treatment 4, choice-price[inexp],
with Treatment 2, choice no price, and Treatment 3, choice-price[exp], with Treatment 2,
16choice no price. As can be seen in Figure 4.4 (exact values are in Table 6.7 in the Appendix),
when subjects had no previous experience, they preferred smaller sets when they had to pay
a price (choice-price[inexp]) than when the price was zero (choice), Table 4.9.11 Even though
di⁄erences are not signi￿cant, for almost all the rounds the set is almost always smaller when
they had to pay a price.
Table 4.6: Comparison: mean size of the choice set for inexperienced subjects with price=340 and price=0.
Round 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 over
all
mean (T2)-mean(T4) 1:73 2:74￿￿ 1:77 1:35 1:89 ￿0:12 0:49 0:89 0 1:64 1:33￿￿￿
***,**,*, indicate signi￿cance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent, respectively.
T2: inexperienced subjects and price=0
T3: experienced subjects and price=340
If Treatments 2 and 3 are compared (price=0; and price=340, with experience), as in
Table 4.7, we see that experienced subjects reduced considerably the size of the set the ￿rst
time they faced a price. Remember that participants in these two treatments are the same.
The di⁄erence between the mean size of the choice set of the last round of price=0 (10th
round) and the ￿rst round (11th round) of price=340 [exp] is a decrease of 5.05 columns.
In addition, the di⁄erence between the ￿rst round and the 11th is signi￿cant. This suggests
that as the complexity of the task increases, so does the aversion for variety.
Table 4.7: Comparison: behavior of participants when a price is introduced.
Round 10-11 1-11
mean (T2)-mean(T3) 5:05￿￿￿ 3:45￿￿
***,**,*, indicate signi￿cance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent, respectively.
column 1: di⁄erence the last round of T2 with no price and the ￿rst with p=340
column 2: di⁄erence between the ￿rst round of each treatment
11Bartlett￿ s tests were run comparing all treatments: 2, 3, and 4. It cannot be rejected that they have
equal variances so we can compare the means.
17Table 4.8: Comparison: mean size of the choice set for subjects that face a price=340 and are experienced
(T3) or inexperienced (T4).
Round 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 over
all
mean (T3)-mean(T4) -1.72 -0.06 -0.18 10.15 0.69 0.98 1.79 2.39￿ 4.89￿￿￿ 5.04￿￿￿ 1.395￿￿￿
***,**,*, indicate signi￿cance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent, respectively.
Another interesting question is how variety aversion is a⁄ected by experience. If I compare
two equal situations (both of them had the same price), with the only di⁄erence being
whether subjects were familiar with the game or not (in Treatment 3 subjects had played
before in the situation with no price), we see that the size of the set increases as experience
increases. Table 4.8 shows that during the ￿rst three rounds experienced subjects chose a
smaller set, but as they play more rounds, they increase the size of the set and continue
to do so. In the last three rounds the size of the set selected by experienced subjects was
signi￿cantly larger than the set selected by inexperienced ones. Experience helps to improve
ability and hence they are able to handle larger sets.
Table 4.9: Comparison: mean size of the choice set for inexperienced subjects with price=340 and price=0.
Round 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 over
all
mean (T2)-mean(T4) 1:73 2:74￿￿ 1:77 1:35 1:89 ￿0:12 0:49 0:89 0 1:64 1:33￿￿￿
***,**,*, indicate signi￿cance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent, respectively.
T2: inexperienced subjects and price=0
T3: experienced subjects and price=340
Another important way of comparing the e⁄ects of complexity and experience is through
the payo⁄s (Table 4.10). To be able to compare the treatments, I take the value of the
column chosen rather than the value minus the price.
We see that experience has a very strong e⁄ect. Treatment 3 (choice-price[exp]) got the
highest payo⁄, one that was signi￿cantly higher than Treatment 4 (choice-price[inexp]). This
18re￿ ects the fact that in the last rounds of choice-price[exp] subjects chose larger sets (note
that they never surpass 16, which is the upper bound of the optimal number of columns). On
the other hand, the e⁄ect of complexity alone (choice and choice-price[inexp]) is negative.
When there is a price and subjects have no experience, they choose smaller sets and the
increased complexity makes their performance deteriorate.
Table 4.10: Mean payo⁄ comparison in Francs.
Treatment payo⁄ di⁄erence
Price=0









***,**,*, indicate signi￿cance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent, respectively.
4.2.3 Do subjects choose optimally?
The evidence presented in section 4.1 suggests that the optimal number of columns is
smaller than 20 and lies between 12 and 16. The mean number of columns chosen when
subjects are inexperienced and do not face a price (Table 4.4) is not signi￿cantly di⁄erent
from 12 but is always statistically di⁄erent from 14 and 16.12 This suggests that subjects￿
choice lies in the lower bound of the optimal interval.
On the other hand, when subjects are experienced (choice-price[exp]), even if they face a
price, the mean size of the choice set belongs to the optimal interval for the last six rounds
[12,16] (Table 4.8). It can be seen that for the last two rounds the mean is not di⁄erent from
16. It should be noted that the optimal interval was obtained from nonexperienced subjects.
However, as the theory would predict, the optimal number of options should increase with
experience, and this is observed in the data.
12It is either 1% or 5% signi￿cantly di⁄erent from 14 in rounds 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, and 9; round 10 has
a 10% signi￿cance level. For all rounds it is 1% signi￿cantly di⁄erent from 16.
195 Conclusions
This paper analyzes the e⁄ect that information overload has on preference or aversion for
variety. According to the model a rational DM who su⁄ers from information overload, faces
a two-stage decision process, and is choosing from a set of unknown goods will use variety
aversion as a strategy to deal with her cognitive limitation. There is an optimum number of
alternatives DMs would like to consider before making a choice. An experiment is conducted
in order to test this hypothesis.
First, the experimental evidence con￿rms that the experimental design and interface used
generated information overload in the subjects, which follows the main assumption of the
model. Second, it also con￿rms that subjects reduce the size of their choice set to deal with
this problem. Moreover, from the results of Treatment 1 (no choice), where a negative e⁄ect
of too much information can be seen, the data suggests that in this setting the optimal
number of options lay between 12 and 16 columns. In addition, the average choices made
by subjects in Treatment 2, where they could choose the size of their choice set, are not
di⁄erent from 12 but are di⁄erent from 14 and 16. This suggests that subjects are choosing
in the lower bound of the optimal range.
With an increase in the complexity of the cognitive process that subjects must perform to
￿nd out the value of a good that is worth consuming, subjects reveal a preference for smaller
sets. Variety aversion increases when subjects who are familiar with the game face a price
for the ￿rst time. The method used in this experiment to increase complexity (introducing a
price) suggests that more expensive objects will require more attention and therefore subjects
would be better o⁄ choosing them from smaller sets.
Subjects￿behavior shows that experience plays a very important role in determining
the size of the choice set selected. As experience increases, subjects want to analyze more
alternatives, and the size of the choice set increases.
This paper helps to understand better the cognitive process subjects follow when choosing
from a set of unknown goods. The results in this paper establish a link between a cognitive
limitation, information overload, and preference or aversion for variety. In this framework,
variety aversion results from the maximization of expected utility subject to the inability
to process information. Experimental results are consistent with the model and show that
subjects behave strategically about their bounded capacity.
20References
[1] Ariely, D., Wertenbroch, K., 2002. Procastination, Deadlines, and Performance: Self-
Control by Precommitment. Psychological Science, 13 (3), 2219-224.
[2] Boatwright, P., and Nunes, J., 2001. Reducing Assortment: An Attribute Base Ap-
proach. Journal of Marketing, 65, 50-63.
[3] Camerer, Colin F.; Johnson, Eric; Rymon, Talia and Sen, Senkar. ￿Cognition and
Framing in Sequential Bargaining for Gains and Losses,￿in Ken Binmore, Alan Kirman,
and Piero Tani, eds., Frontiers of game theory. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1993, 27￿
47.
[4] Costa-Gomes, Miguel A. and Crawford, Vincent P., 2006. Cognition and Behavior in
Two-Person Guessing Games: An Experimental Study. American Economic Review, 96
(5), 1737-1768
[5] Gabaix, X., Laibson, D., 2003. Bounded rationality and directed cognition. Unpub-
lished working paper. Massachusetts Institute of Technology and Harvard University,
Cambridge, MA.
[6] Gabaix, X., Laibson, D., Moloche, G., Weinberg, S., 2006. Costly information Ac-
quisition: Experimental Analysis if a Boundedly Rational Model. American Economic
Review, 96 (4), 1043-1068.
[7] Gourville, J., Soman, Dilip., 2005. Overchoice and Assortment Type: When and Why
Variety Back￿res. Marketing Science, 24 (3), 382-395.
[8] Iyengar, S. and Lepper, M., 2000. When Choice is Demotivating: Can One Desire Too
Much of a Good Thing? Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 79 (6), 995-1006.
[9] Jacoby, J., Speller, D., Berning,C., 1974. Brand Choice Behavior as a Function of In-
formation Load: Replication and Extension. The Journal of Consumer Research, 1 (1),
33-42.
[10] Jacoby, J., 1984. Perspectives on Information Overload. Journal of Consumer Research,
10 (March), 432-435.
[11] Keller, K., Staelin, R., 1987. E⁄ects of Quality and Quantity of Information on Decision
E⁄ectiveness. The Journal of Consumer Research, 14 (2), 200-213.
21[12] Lavie, N., 2005. Distracted and confused?: Selective attention under load. Trends in
Cognitive Sciences, 9 (2), 75-82.
[13] Muller, Thomas E., 1984. Buyer Response to Variations in Product Information Load,
Journal of Applied Psychology, 69 (May), 300-306.
[14] Neisser, U., 1963. Decision-Time without Reaction-Time: Experiments in Visual Scan-
ning. The American Journal of Psychology, 76 (3), 376-385.
[15] Reutskaja, E., Hogarth, R., 2009. Satisfaction in Choice as a Function of the Number
of Alternatives: When "Goods Satiate". Psychology & Marketing, Vol. 26(3), 1997-203.
[16] Salgado, M., 2006. Choosing to have less choice. Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei. Working
paper 37.2006.
[17] Sarver, T., 2008. Anticipating regret: why fewer options may be better. Econometrica,76
(2), 263￿ 305.
[18] Scammon, Debra L., 1977. Information Load and Consumers, Journal of Consumer
Research, 4 (December), 148-155.
[19] Simon, Herbert A. ￿A Behavioral Model of Rational Choice.￿ Quarterly Journal of
Economics,1955, 69(1), 99￿ 118.
[20] Shah, A., and Wolford G., 2007. Buying Behavior as a Function of Parametric Variation
of Number of Choices. Psychological Science, 18 (5), 369-370.
[21] Wertenbroch, K., 1998. Consumption Self-Control by Rationing Purchase Quantities of
Virtue and Vice. Marketing Science, 17 (4), 317-337.
[22] Wilson, A. "Bounded Memory and Biases in Information Processing." Harvard Univer-
sity, Mimeograph, April 2006.
226 Appendix
6.1 Proof of Theorem 1
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The strategy of the proof is to ￿nd a function f : (0;1) ! (0;1) such that UM(n) <
f(n) for n su￿ciently large, and such that limx!1 f(x) = 0: This would imply that








where ￿ : (0;1) ! [0;1] is any strictly decreasing function such that ￿(n) = ￿(n) if
n 2 N: We argue that UM(n) < f(n).
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Pn
i=1 p(‘ = i)):
To see that the inequality holds, one only needs to notice that 1
2p(‘ = 1) < n
n+1p(‘ = 1);
2
3p(‘ = 2) < n
n+1p(‘ = 2) and so on.
Finally, since limx!1 f(x) = 0 there must exist an n such that f(n) <
￿(1)
2 : for all n > n:
Since there are only ￿nitely many numbers between 1 and n; a maximal n￿ must exist.
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***,**,*, indicate signi￿cance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent, respectively.
s.e in parenthesis
Table 6.3: Mean Payo⁄.
columns mean payo⁄ st.errors columns mean payo⁄ st.errors
2 324.4 7.135214 12 367.65 4.929705
4 339.275 6.929127 14 360.725 10.42199
6 359.875 5.966156 16 370.75 4.935579
8 358.475 5.707618 18 361.175 9.994735
10 366.6 5.523818 20 360.325 10.74562
24Table 6.4: Payo⁄ ￿tted values by column.
columns payo⁄ st.errors columns payo⁄ st.errors
2 327.868 5.907204 12 368.1327 3.55781
4 340.7084 3.966987 14 369.0044 3.321595
6 351.1551 3.216952 16 367.4824 3.216952
8 359.2081 3.321595 18 363.5666 3.966987
10 364.8673 3.55781 20 357.257 5.907204
Table 6.5: Frequency of 20 being choosen
number of times
20 was choosen 0 1 2 3 6 7 10
number of
subjects 23 5 1 2 1 1 7
Table 6.6: Mean time per column per round











































(T2) ￿ (T1) 188:1 412:1 599:9 1058:0￿ 446:2￿ 766:3￿ 893:1￿￿￿ 534:3￿￿ 657:7￿ 205:8￿
***,**,*, indicate signi￿cance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent, respectively.
Time is measured in milliseconds
25Table 6.7: Mean size of the choice set.
















































































6.4 Assignment of Games for Experiment 1
A game has 20 columns. Each column has 5 rows. The numbers in each column are
generated from a discrete uniform distribution on the interval [20,100].
N is the number of subjects. N di⁄erent games are generated at the beginning of the
experiment. There are 10 rounds. Each round has 2,4,6,8,10,12,14,16,18, or 20 columns. In
round 1 subjects see only 1 column; in round 2, 2 columns; etc.
Lets denote Gk;r the kth game generated that appears in round r, so only the ￿rst r
columns of the game appear on the screen.
Each round each subject will play the following sequence of games:
Subjectnround 1 2 3 ... 8 9 10
1 G1;1 GN;2 Gn￿1;3 ::: GN￿6;8 GN￿7;9 GN￿8;10
2 G2;1 G1;2 GN;3 ::: GN￿5;8 GN￿6;9 GN￿7;10
3 G3;1 G2;2 G1;3 ::: GN￿4;8 GN￿5;9 GN￿6;10
... :::
N-2 GN￿2;1 GN￿3;2 GN￿4;3 ::: G1;8 GN;9 GN￿1;10
N-1 GN￿1;1 GN￿2;2 GN￿3;3 ::: G2;8 G1;9 GN;10
N GN;1 GN￿1;2 GN￿2;3 ::: GN￿7;8 GN￿8;9 GN￿9;10
286.5 (Not for publication) Instructions
Thank you for agreeing to participate in this experiment. This is an experiment in
decision making. During the experiment we require your complete, undistracted attention
and ask that you follow instructions carefully. Please turn o⁄ your cell phones. Do not
open other applications on your computer, chat with other students, or engage in other
distracting activities. You will be paid for your participation in cash, at the end of the
experiment. Di⁄erent participants may earn di⁄erent amounts. What you earn depends
on your decisions. The entire experiment will take place through computer terminals. It
is important that you not talk or in any way try to communicate with other participants
during the experiments.
We will start with a brief instruction period. During the instruction period, you will be
given a complete description of the experiment and will be shown how to use the computers.
If you have any questions during the instruction period, please raise your hand and your
question will be answered out loud so everyone can hear. If you have any questions after
the experiment has begun, raise your hand, and an experimenter will come and assist you.
After the Instructions, there will be a practice session. You will not be paid for the match
in the practice session. The practice session will be followed by the paid session. At the end
of the paid session, you will be paid the sum of what you have earned, plus a show-up fee of
$10.00. Everyone will be paid in private and you are under no obligation to tell others how
much you earned. Your earnings during the experiment are denominated in francs for this
experiment the value of a franc varies en each part of the experiment. The computer keeps
a record of the payments.
In this experiment there will be 3 parts. Before each part begins the instructions corre-
sponding to that part will be given to you.
First Part:
In this experiment there will be 10 rounds. In each round you will be choosing an object
from a set.
Each round has two stages. In the ￿rst stage you will have to choose the number of
objects you want to choose from. You can choose an even number from 2 to 20. In the
second stage you can choose an object.
[Screen 1]
An object is a list of 5 numbers. Each of these ￿ve numbers can take a value from 20 to
100 with equal probability.
[Screen 2]
The value of an object is the sum of the 5 numbers.
29In the second stage you will have to choose a column from the number of columns you
chose before. You will have 25 seconds to choose a column, your payo⁄of choosing a column
is the value of the column times the conversion rate. The exchange rate for this part is .002,
this means that if you earn 3000 francs you earn 6 dollars. The computer will keep record
of your payo⁄s.
If you don￿ t make a choice before time runs out your payo⁄ for that round will be zero.
Once you make a choice the payo⁄ that you earn on that round will appear on the screen.
[Screen 3]
The ￿rst screen of the experiment on your computer should look similar to this screen.
[POINT TO PPT SLIDE DISPLAYED ON SCREEN IN FRONT OF ROOM] Please note
that the screen exhibited up front is not necessarily the same as any of the screen exhibited
on your computer. All the slides we display in front are just to illustrate and are not supposed
to be suggestive in any way.
Once you select an even number from 2 to 20 and click submit the following screen that
you will see will look like this
[Screen 4]
On the upper right of your screen there is a clock that shows the remaining time you
have to make your decision
On the lower part of the screen you will see the payo⁄ history: First you will see your
payo⁄ for this round, the accumulated payo⁄ in the game, and your total payo⁄.
[Screen 5]
Once you click in a column it will be selected and the value of all the objects will appear
in the screen. Note that the maximum value will be highlighted in red. Also, note that your
payo⁄ for that round appears and is added to the accumulated payo⁄ in the total payo⁄.
This information will appear on your screen for 5 seconds before continuing.
[Screen 6]
After each round you will have to click to proceed to the next round.
We will now begin the Practice round. During the practice round, please select a column
and then click on the proceed button. Remember, you are not paid for this practice round.
[AUTHENTICATE CLIENTS]
Please double click on the tree icon on your desktop that says info. When the computer
prompts you for your name, type your First and Last name. Then click SUBMIT and wait
for further instructions.
[START GAME]
Please answer the practice session
We are ready to start. We will now begin with the 10 paid rounds. Please pull out your
30dividers for the paid session of the experiment. If there are any problems or questions from
this point on, raise your hand and an experimenter will come and assist you.
Once the objects appear on the screen, please select a column, and then click on the
proceed button.
Are there any questions before we begin with the paid session?
Start...
This completes the ￿rst part of the experiment.
Second Part:
[Screen 7]
In this part of the experiment before each round, you will have to choose how many
columns you want to see in the following screen. Once you select an even number from 2 to
20 and click submit you will see a screen with the number of columns you selected.
[Screen 8]
Each time you select a column you have to pay a price of $340 francs. If you don￿ t select
a column you pay $0 francs.
[Screen]
What you earn at the end of part 3 will be determined by the following rule: total payo⁄
times the conversion rate of .0085
Or zero if your total payo⁄ at the end of the 10th round is less than 0 francs.
For example...
[Screen 9]
Are there any questions?
We will go now through a practice session. You won￿ t be paid for the practice session.
Please double click on the icon on your desktop that says info. When the computer
prompts you for your name, type your First and Last name. Then click SUBMIT and wait
for further instructions.
Please answer the practice session
This is the end of the practice session. Are there any questions before we start the paid
rounds?
Please start...
This marks the end the experiment.
Third Part:
In the third part of the experiment you are asked to ￿ll out a survey.
Now please double click on the icon on your desktop that says survey. When the computer
prompts you for your name, type your ￿rst and last name. Then click submit and wait for
31further instructions.
Please now answer the survey.
[Screen 10]
Your total payo⁄ is your payo⁄ from the ￿rst and second parts of the experiment plus
the show-up fee of $10. We will pay each of you in private in the next room in the order of
your arrival.
Please make sure you have ￿lled out the voucher sheet and sign it and turn it when you
receive payment. You are under no obligation to reveal your earnings to the other players.
This completes the experiment. We will pay each of you in private in the next room in
the order of your Subject ID numbers. You are under no obligation to reveal your earnings
to the other participants. Thank you for your participation.
6.6 (Not for publication) Survey Questions
Please answer the following questions as honestly as possible. Use the scroll bar on the
right to scroll down.
What is your age?
What is your name?
What is your major?





4=Native American / Native Hawaiian / Native Eskimo
5=Paci￿c Islander
Other (please specify)
What is your gender?
0=Male
1=Female







Have you ever taken an economics class?
0=Yes
1=No






Please answer the remaining questions carefully.
Do you think having too many columns to choose from is distracting?
0=Yes
1=No
If you could choose the number of columns before each round, what number would be
your choice?(number from 1 to 20)
Did you ever chose randomly?
0=Yes
1=No





What kind of strategy you used when the number of columns was big?
0=Adding numbers
1=Comparison among columns
2=Random Choice
3=Other (please specify)
33